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Abstract
       This paper examines different characterizations of the Relative Majority Rule, Absolute Majority Rule, and
variations of those two, chronologically. Basically, Relative Majority Rule, as the name suggests, concerns with
the relative number of supporters of the different alternatives. Whereas Absolute Majority Rule requires an
alternative to be chosen more than half of the supporters to win. Relative Majority may cause an alternative with
very poor support to win (i.e. one alternative has only one supporter and the other alternative has no supporters
with 1000 voters will end up with the decision of this single voter at a two-alternative world.); on the other hand,
it may for most of the time be difficult to have one of the alternatives to win via Absolute Majority Rule.
Therefore, need for some moderate rules arises. Mk Majority helps us here as the number of supporters of the
winner needs to exceed number of supporters of the other alternative by k voters. We may also need a more strict
rule (If an alternative will win then for some cases, we may require it to have much more wider support). Then it
is better to use Absolute q-Majority Rule, where we can chose q among the numbers, which is more than the
number of half of the society. In the first section, necessary definitions and axioms are illustrated, and in the next
section, Majority Rule characterizations and related theorems are given with their detailed proofs.
(Özet
Bu çalışma, Göreceli Çoğunluk Kuralı, Mutlak Çoğunluk Kuralı ve bunların farklı varyasyonlarını
kronolojik olarak incelemektedir. Temel olarak Göreceli Çoğunluk Kuralı, adından da anlışlacağı gibi, farklı
alternatiflerin destekçilerinin göreceli sayıları ile belirlenir. Diğer taraftan Mutlak Çoğunluk Kuralı, bir
alternatifin seçilebilmesi için oyların mutlak çoğunluğunu almasını gerektirir. Göreceli Çoğunluk Kuralı, çok az
desteğe sahip olan alternatifin kazanmasına neden olabilirken (2 alternatifli bir dünyada, 1000 kişilik bir grupta
bir kişinin desteklediği alternatif, diğerinin hiç destekçisi olmaması durumunda oylamayı kazanacaktır.) Mutlak
Çoğunluk Kuralı kullanılarak herhangi bir alternatifin oylamayı kazanması çoğu zaman zordur. Bu sebeplerden
daha güçlü ve daha belirleyici orta seviyedeki seçim kurallarına ihtiyaç doğmuştur. Bu noktada bir alternatifin
kazanması için diğerinden k sayıda fazla destekçi gerektiren Mk Çoğunluk Kuralı devreye girer. Bazı durumlarda
çok daha katı bir kurala gereksinim de duyabiliriz. Bu durumlarda, bir alternatifin kazanması için toplumun yarı
nüfusundan büyük sayılar arasından seçilen q sayısından fazla detekçiye gereksinim duyan Mutlak q-Çoğunluk
Kuralı’nı kullanabiliriz. İlk bolümde gerekli tanım ve aksiyomlar, ikinci bölümde ise karakterizasyon ve ilgli
diğer teoremler ayrıntılı ispatlarıyla birlikte sunulmuştur.)

1Introduction
Majority Rule is a very important Social Choice Rule as it adresses the prefer-
ences of each individual to aggregate decision of the whole society with the sence of
Majority. May (1952) characterized majority rule via anonimity, neurality and posi-
tive responsiveness. After May's work As¸an-Sanver (2002), Woeginger (2003), Miroiu
(2004), Woeginger (2005), Llamazares (2006), As¸an-Sanver (2006), Sanver (2006) de-
ned characterizations for various types of majority rules. Characterizations made later
than May's characterization, which was critisized for using the too much strong con-
dition positively respensiveness, drop positively responsiveness and also anonimity in
some cases and use instead conditions like pareto optimality and weakly path inde-
pendence (As¸an-Sanver), reducibility to subsocieties (Woeginger), additive possitive
responsiveness and subset decomposibility (Miroiu), cancellativeness (Llamazares),
maskin monotonicity (As¸an-Sanver).
This paper collects major characterizations of different types of majority rules
at a two alternatives world, where all the individuals have complete and transitive
preferences over these two alternatives: x and y:
Basic Notations
Let N = fj1; :::::jngbe a society and assume that each individual j 2 N has
complete and transitive preference relations on a set of alternatives A = fx; yg.
2We say Ri = 1 when the individual i prefers the alternative x to y; Ri =  1
when the individual i prefers the alternative y to x; and Ri = 0 when the individual i
is indifferent between the alternatives x and y.
Let H be a subsociety of N such that H = fk1; ::::::khg.
SWF (Social Welfare Function): F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g :
Ej= eji=

1; if i  j;
0; otherwise

U+= fR 2 f 1; 0; 1gn : n+(R) = n  1; n (R) = 0g
U = fR 2 f 1; 0; 1gn : n+(R) = 0; n (R) = n  1g
U = U+ [ U  here [ does not mean the union in the common sense, but it
means simply "or".
The operation: R  R0 = (R1; ::::::Rn; Rn+1; ::::::Rn+n0) 2 f 1; 0; 1gn+n
0
; for
given any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn and R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn0 :
p = n+(R) := # fi 2 N j Ri = 1g,
m = n (R) := # fi 2 N j Ri =  1g
z := n0(R) := # fi 2 N j Ri = 0g
(Note that p+m+z=n)
Axioms and Independence
3PR (Positively Responsiveness): For any proles R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn with R0i 
Ri (resp. ) 8i 2 N and R0j > Rj (resp. <) for some j 2 S, we have that F (R)  0
(resp. ) =) F (R0) = 1 (resp.  1).
APR (Additive Positive Responsiveness): For anyR 2 f 1; 0; 1gn withF (R) 
0 and Ri = 1, i =2 N (resp. F (R)  0 and Ri =  1) we have F (R  Ri) = 1 (resp.
F (RRi) =  1).
M (Maskin Monotonicity): For any proles R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that Ri 
0 =) R0i  0 ( resp.) 8i 2 N , we have F (R)  0 =) F (R0)  0:( resp.).
NE (Neutrality): For any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn, we've F ( R) =  F (R)
A (Anonimity): For any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn, and any permutation function  :
N  ! N , we've F (R1; ::::::Rn) = F (R(1) ; ::::::::R(n))
PO (Pareto Optimal): For any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn, with Ri  0 (resp. Ri  0),
8i 2 N and Rj = 1 (resp. Rj =  1) for some j 2 N , we've F (R) = 1 (resp.
F (R) =  1)
WPO (Weakly Pareto Optimal): If Ri = 1 holds for all i 2 N , then F (R) = 1:
PI (Path Independence): LetN = f1; ::::ng,N 0 = fn+ 1; ::::n+ n0g :A SWF F
is said to be PI iff for any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn and R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn0 , we've F (RR0) =
F (F (R) F (R0)):
4WPI (Weak Path Independence): F is said to be WPI iff for any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn
and any R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn0 with jF (R)  F (R0)j 6= 2, we've F (RR0) = F (F (R)
F (R0))
RS (Reducibility to Subsocieties): For any prole R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn with n 
2, we've F (R) = F (F (R 1); ::::F (R n)): Where R i 2 f 1; 0; 1gn 1 denote the
prole that results from removing the ith voter from prole R:
SD (Subset Decomposability): A SWF F for a societyH = fk1; :::::khg (h  1)
is SD iff F (H) = F (F (H1); ::::::::F (Hm)) where Hj (1  j  2h   1) is a proper
subset of H:
C (Cancelative): A SWF F is is cancelative if for all pair of proles R;R0 2
f 1; 0; 1gn such that Ri = 1; Rj =  1 and R0i = R0j = 0 for some i; j 2 N , and
R0l = Rl 8l 2 Nn fi; jg, we have F (R0) = F (R):
p-Pareto: Given p 2 f0; 1; ::::::::n  1g, F is p-Pareto if:
a) For any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn ;
i) If n+(R) > p and n (R) = 0, then F (R) = 1:
ii) If n (R) > p and n+(R) = 0, then F (R) =  1:
b) If p 2 f1; ::::::::n  1g ; 9 R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that it satisifes one of
the following conditions:
i) n+(R) = p; n (R) = 0 and F (R) < 1:
ii) n (R) = p; n+(R) = 0 and F (R) >  1:
5q-Stable: Given q 2 f0; 1; ::::::::n  1g ; a SWF F is q-Stable if it satises the
following conditions:
i) 8R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that # fi 2 N j Ri 6= R0ig  q;
F (R) = 1 =) F (R0)  0; F (R) =  1 =) F (R0)  0
ii) 9R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that# fi 2 N j Ri 6= R0ig = q + 1 satisfying
F (R) = 1 and F (R0) =  1:
NSA (Null Society Assumption): If H = ?, then F (H) = 0.
MkMajority: Given k 2 f0; 1; ::::::::n  1g, theMkMajority is the SWF dened
by
Mk(R) =
8>>><>>>:
1; if
nP
i=1
Ri > k;
 1; if
nP
i=1
Ri <  k;
0; otherwise:
9>>>=>>>; or by N Mk(R) = 1 () n+(R) >
n (R) + k:
MR (Relative Majority Rule): The MR is dened at each R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn as
(MR(R) = 1() n+(R) > n+(R)) and (MR(R) =  1() n (R) > n+(R)).
UNA (Unanimous Majority Rule): A SWF that assigns UNA(R) = 1 (-1 resp.)
only if all voters i 2 N have Ri = 1 (-1 resp.) and UNA(R) = 0 in all other cases.
Absolute q-majority: Let n be the lowest integer exceeding n=2. Picking some
q 2 fn; :::::::; n+ 1g, absolute q-majority rule is dened as an aggregation rule F
such that 8R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn we have F (R) = 1 () n+(R)  q and F (R) =
 1() n (R)  q.
6AMR (Absolute Majority Rule): Let n be the lowest integer exceeding n=2.
The AMR is dened at each R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn as (AMR(R) = 1 () n+(R)  n)
and (AMR(R) =  1() n (R)  n).
Below theorem shows that PR and APR are not the same and neither implies the
other.
Theorem 1 (Woeginger, 2005) There exists a SWF F1 that satises A and PR, but
not APR. There exists a SWF F2 that satises A and APR, but not PR.
Proof
(A and PR, but not APR) F1 is dened as F1(1) = F1(0) = 1 and F1( 1) = 0
for n = 1, and F1 = 1 for n  2 voters. F1 is A as for n  2, we always have F1 = 1,
no matter what permutation we take. F1 is also PR as F1(R)  0 is only the case when
F1( 1) = 0 where the voter is being the most negative. As there is no other prole
satisfying F1(R)  0, we cannot establish any further negative prole, either. On the
other hand F1 is not APR since F1( 1) = 0 and if we add voter  1 to the society
F1( 1; 1) should be equal to  1 whereas here we have F1( 1; 1) = 1.
(A and APR, but not PR) F2 is dened as F2(1) = F2( 1) = 1 and F2(0) = 0
for n = 1 and for n  2, F2 is dened as:
F2(R) = 0, if n+(R) = n (R) = 0
F2(R) = 1, if n (R) = 0 and n+(R) > 0
7F2(R) =  1, if n+(R) = 0 and n (R) > 0
F2(R) = 1, if n+(R) > 0 and n (R) > 0
F2 does not satisfy PR since F2(0) = 0 implies F2( 1) =  1 by PR, but here
we have F2( 1) = 1. F2 is clearly A. To see that F2 satises APR:
First let F2(R)  0 then either:
n+(R) = n (R) = 0, and if we add  1 to the society, we have n+(R) = 0
and n (R) > 0, which gives us F2(R) =  1. Or
n+(R) = 0 and n (R) > 0, and if we add  1 to the society, we again have
n+(R) = 0 and n (R) > 0, which gives us F2(R) =  1.
Second let F2(R)  0 then either:
n+(R) = n (R) = 0, and if we add 1 to the society, we have n (R) = 0
and n+(R) > 0, which gives us F2(R) = 1. Or
n (R) = 0 and n+(R) > 0, and if we add 1 to the society, we again have
n (R) = 0 and n+(R) > 0, which gives us F2(R) = 1. Or
n+(R) > 0 and n (R) > 0, and if we add 1 to the society, we have
n (R) > 0 and n+(R) > 0, which gives us F2(R) = 1. 
Theorem 2 (Woeginger, 2003) There exists a SWF F:f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g
that is not the majority rule and that satises the axioms:
a) N, A, RS, but not PO: F (R)  0 is N, A, RS, but not PO. Since F (1; :::::; 1) 6=
1:
8b) N, A, PO, but not RS:F (R) =
8<: 1; if Rj = 1 for some j 2 N and Ri  0; 8i 2 N; 1; if Rj = 1 for some j 2 N and Ri  0; 8i 2 N;0; otherwise.
9=;
Since F (1; 1; 1) = 0 6= F (0; 0; 1) = F (F (1; 1); F (1; 1); F (1; 1)) F is not RS.
c) A, PO, RS, but not N:F (R) =
8<: 0; if Ri = 0; 8i 2 N;1; if Rj = 1 for some j 2 N and Ri  0 8i 2 N; 1; otherwise.
9=; :
Since  F (1; 1) =  ( 1) = 1 6=  1 = F ( 1; 1), it is not N: 
Results
1) Impossibilities
Theorem 3 (As¸an-Sanver, 2006) There exists no SWF, which satises M and PO.
Proof.
Suppose for a contradiction, F is an aggregation rule which satises M and PO.
Take some R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn and WLOG consider the case F (R) 2 f0; 1g : Dene
another prole R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn be such that R0i = 0 () Ri 2 f0; 1g and R0i =
 1 () Ri =  1;8i 2 N: F (R0) =  1 by PO and F (R0) 2 f0; 1g by M gives us a
contradiction. 
2) Characterizations
First, see below some MR implications:
9M1) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g is MR =) It is NE: If F (R) = 0
then n+(R) = n (R) and F ( R) = 0 as well. If F (R) = 1 then n+(R) > n (R)
meaning when we multiply R by  1, we get n (R) > n+(R) =) F ( R) =  1 =
 F (R): The case of F (R) =  1 is symmetrical to F (R) =  1. Hence F is NE.
M2) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g is MR =) It is PO: Take any R 2
f 1; 0; 1gn such that Ri  0 (respectively Ri  0) 8i 2 N and Rj = 1 (respectively
Rj =  1) for some j 2 N then n+(R) > 0 and n (R) = 0 =) n+(R) > n (R) =)
F (R) = 1 (respectively n+(R) = 0 and n (R) > 0 =) n (R) > n+(R) =)
F (R) =  1):Hence F is PO.
M3) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g is MR =) It is WPI: Take any
k; k0 > 0 and consider two disjoint societies K = f1; ::::; kg and K 0 = fk + 1; ::::; ng
(where k + k0 = n) and take any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gk ; and any R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gk0 with
jF (R)  F (R0)j 6= 2 then
a) If n+(R) = n (R) (i.e. F (R) = 0) and n+(R0) = n (R0) (i.e. F (R0) =
0) =) n+(RR0) = n (RR0) =) F (R0 R00) = 0:
If n+(R  R0) = n (R  R0) and as jF (R)  F (R0)j 6= 2 we must have
n+(R) = n (R) (i.e. F (R) = 0) and n+(R0) = n (R0) (i.e. F (R0) = 0)=)
F (F (R) F (R0)) = 0:
b) If n+(R) > n (R) (i.e. F (R) = 1) then either we have n+(R0) >
n (R0) or n+(R0) = n (R0) (i.e. F (R0)  0) =) n+(R  R0) > n (R  R0) =)
F (RR0) = 1:
10
If n+(RR0) > n (RR0) and as jF (R)  F (R0)j 6= 2wemust have both
n+(R)  n (R) and n+(R0)  n (R0); furthermore, one of the inequalities should
be strict, say WLOG n+(R0) > n (R0) =) F (F (R) F (R0)) = 1:The reverse case
can similarly be shown.
Hence F is WPI.
M4) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g is MR =) It is A: F is A as the
only concern of MR is the relative number of supporters of the two alternatives, it does
not matter who supports whom.
M5) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g is MR =) It is PR: Take any
proles R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn with R0i  Ri 8i 2 N and R0j > Rj for some j 2 N ,
and let F (R)  0 then n+(R)  n (R) but as R0j > Rj for some j 2 N we have
n+(R
0) > n (R0) which consequently implies F (R0) = 1: Hence F is PR.
M6) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g is MR =) It is RS: Take any
R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn :
F (R) = 0 () n+(R) = n (R): As F is MR, and so A, let Ri = 1;
Ri+1 =  1 8i  k for some odd interger k: (Note that k < n) Then we have
F (F (R 1); ::::::::F (R n)) = F ( 1; 1; 1; 1; :::::  1; 1; 0; ::::; 0) = 0 = F (R):
F (R) = 1 such that n+(R) = n (R) + 1: Then F (R i)  08i 2 N and
F (R j) = 1 for some j 2 N:ByAwe can set the order such thatF (1; :::; 1; 0; ::::; 0) =
1 = F (R):
11
F (R) = 1 such that n+(R) > n (R) + 1:Then F (R i) = 18i 2 N =)
F (1; :::; 1) = 1 = F (R):
The case F (R) =  1 can similarly be shown as F (R) = 1:
Hence F is RS.
M7) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g is MR =) It is WPO: Take any
R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that Ri = 1 8i 2 N then n+(R) = n meaning denitely
n+(R) > n (R) =) F (R) = 1: Hence F is WPO.
M8) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g is MR =) It is C: MR is obviously
C as we are interested in n+(R) and n (R) only relatively; therefore, cancelling out
one x supporter and one y supporter does not change the result.
Proposition 4 (May, 1952) A social welfare function (SWF) F : f 1; 0; 1gn  !
f 1; 0; 1g satises A, NE, PR() It is the MR.
Proof.
( (= ): Take any SWF F which is MR, then it is A by M4, NE by M1 and PR
by M5.
(=)): Take a SWF F which is A, NE and PR. Consider:
p = m : Then F (R) = 0: For a contradiction assume that F (R) = 1 then by NE
F ( R) =  1 but F ( R) = F (R) by A.
12
p = m + 1 : Then F (R) = 1 by PR and above case. We can iterate this case
further and by the same reasoning we will get F (R) = 1 for p = m + k where
0 < k  n m:
Hence p > m implies F (R) = 1:
m = p + 1 : Then F (R) =  1 by PR and above case. We can iterate this case
further and by the same reasoning we will get F (R) =  1 for m = p + k where
0 < k  n  p:
Hencem > p implies F (R) =  1:Which completes the proof that F is the MR.

After May was criticised by using a too strong condition, PR, in his characteri-
zation some other characterizations including more than two alternatives were estab-
lished also by May. However, we will next look at the below theorem formed by As¸an
and Sanver, which replaces PR with PO and WPI, still concerning two alternatives.
Theorem 5 (As¸an-Sanver, 2002) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g satises A,
NE, PO and WPI() F is the MR.
Proof.
( =): Take a SWF F which is MR. Then F is A by M4, NE by M1, PO by M2
and WPI by M3.
(=)): Take any SWF F which is A, N, PO and WPI. Take any n > 0 for
N = f1; :::::ng.
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To show F is MR, we need to show 8R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn, we have:
1) n+(R) = n (R) =) F (R) = 0
For a contradiction, assume WLOG F (R) = 1 but F ( R) = 1 by A, and
F ( R) =  1 by N, which gives a contradiction.
2) n+(R) > n (R) =) F (R) = 1
Take any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn with n+(R) > n (R) and let k := n+(R)   n (R).
Now take some K  fi 2 N : Ri = 1g such that j K j= k: Consider K and N  K
withR0 2 f 1; 0; 1gk andR00 2 f 1; 0; 1gn k dened asRi0 = Ri 8i 2 K,Ri00 = Ri
8i 2 N  K
Hence n+(R0) = k =) F (R0) = 1 by PO, and n+(R00) = n (R00) =)
F (R00) = 0 by NE and A of F . Thus jF (R0)  F (R00)j 6= 2 , and F (R0  R00) =
F (F (R0)F (R00)) by WPI. As we constructedR;R0 so asR0R00 = R =) F (R) =
F (1; 0) which is equal to 1 as F is PO.
3) n+(R) < n (R) =) F (R) =  1
This part of proof is similar to (2) 
Theorem 6 (Woeginger, 2003) Let F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g be a SWF that
satises NE, RS, and the anchor condition F (0; 1) = 1. Then F satises WPO() F
satises PO.
Proof.
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(=)): Let F be N, RS, F (0; 1) = 1 and WPO, we need to show F is PO as
well. For proof by induction, rst let n = 1 then F (1) = 1 and F ( 1) =  1 by WPO.
For n = 2; F (1; 1) = 1 and F ( 1; 1) =  1 by again WPO. We assumed at the
begining, F (0; 1) = 1 by N F (0; 1) =  1 and by RS F (0; 1) = F ( 1; 0) =  1
and F (0; 1) = F (1; 0) = 1: Then F is PO for n  2.
( (= ): Now take any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn with n  3 such that Ri  0, 8i 2 N
and Rj = 1, for some j 2 N: Thenm = 0; p  1 and z = n  p:
First consider p = 1 then z = n 1  2: n 1 of the subsocieties have one voter
prefering 1 and other voters prefering 0. And in the remaining one society everybody
votes for 0. Then by induction and RS, we get F (R) = F (R0) (i.e. every subsociety
provides PO), where R0 has (p0; z0;m0) = (n  1; 1; 0): then F (R0) = 1.
Second, consider p  2: Then every subsociety has at least one voter prefering
1.whereas the remaining voters either prefer 1 or 0. As we assumed for the induction
hypothesis, every subsociety has 1 as aggregate decision. As F is RS, F (R) = F (R00)
for R00 such that (p00; z00;m00) = (n; 0; 0) and F (R00) = 1 by WPO.
Hence F (R) = 1: The reverse case is symmetrical. 
Theorem 7 (Woeginger, 2003) A SWF F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g satises NE,
PO and RS() it is the MR.
Proof.
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( =): Take a SWF F; which is MR. NE, PO and RS were proved at M1, M2
and M6.
(=)): By induction:
n = 1 =) F (1) = 1 = MR(1) and F ( 1) =  1 = MR( 1) by PO and
F (0) = 0 =MR(0) by N.
Hence for R 2 f 1; 0; 1g1, we have F (R) =MR(R)
n  2 =) Assume 8R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn 1, F (R0) = MR(R0): Consider R 2
f 1; 0; 1gn and let p := n+(R), m := n (R), z := n0(R) (Note that p+m+z=n).
There are three cases to look at:
If p = m =) F (R n) = MR(R n) =  Rn (As we exclude the nth person.)
8n 2 S by induction hypothesis. F (R) = F (F (R 1); ::::::::; F (R n)) = F ( R) by
RS and F ( R) =  F (R) by N. Hence F (R) =  F (R), meaning F (R) = 0 =
MR(R):
If p  m+1 holds, then eliminating any single individual will lead p  m for all
individuals, and p > m for some individuals.By induction, F (R0) = MR(R0)8R0 2
f 1; 0; 1gn 1 : (i.e. it may look like F (1; :::; 1; 0; ::::; 0)). And by PO F (R) = 1 =
MR(R):
If p  m   1 holds then F (R) = MR(R) and the proof is symmetric to the
previous one. 
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Theorem 8 (Woeginger, 2003-4) Let F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g be a SWF that
satises NE, WPO, and RS:
a) If F (0; 1) = 1, then F is the MR.
b) If F (0; 1) = 0, then F is the UNA.
Proof.
a) If F (0; 1) = 1, thenWPO  PO Hence, the previous two theorems together
shows the result.
b) Then F (0; 1) = 0 and F (0; 0) = F ( 1; 1) = 0 by NE, and F (1; 1) = 1 and
F ( 1; 1) =  1 by WPO. Therefore, F (R) = UNA(R) for n  2:
To prove by induction, assume we have F (R) = UNA(R) for n  1 voters and
n  3: Consider R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn :
If p = n; then WPO yields F (R) = UNA(R) = 1:
If p = n   1; then also by RS F (R) = F (R0) where R0 has (p0; z0;m0) =
(1; n 1; 0): applying RS and induction again one more time, we have F (R0) = F (R00)
where R00 has (p00; z00;m00) = (0; n; 0): As F is NE, F (R00) = 0, hence F (R) =
UNA(R) = 0:
If 2  p  n   2; then RS and induction together imply F (R) = F (R0)
where R0 has (p0; z0;m0) = (0; n; 0): Hence F (R) = UNA(R) = 0:
The cases wherem  2 can be proved symmetrically.
Finally, if p  1 and m  1; then z  n   2  1: Then the function F
gives 0 for all subsocieties of R. Then F (R) = UNA(R) = 0 by RS and N. 
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Lemma 9 (Miroiu, 2004) If a SWF F satises NSA, AR, and NE, then F (Rj) = Rj .
Proof.
F (?) = 0 by NSA
Now let Rj = 1 (resp. Rj =  1) then F (? [Rj) = F (Rj) = 1 by AR.
ForRj = 0, F (Rj) = 0 by NE. (ie. Assume for a contradictionWLOG F (Rj) =
1 =) 1 = F (Rj) = F ( Rj) =  F (Rj) =  1#) 
Lemma 10 (Miroiu, 2004) If a SWF F satises NSA, AR, and NE, then it satises
PO.
Proof.
For subsociety H let Ri  08i and Ri = 1 for somei 2 H: By induction,
n = 1=) F (H) = 1 by above Lemma.
n  2=) Assume F is PO for n  1 voters and jHj = n  1 and j =2 H , where
Rj  0. Then jH [ fjgj = n: (Note that if Ri = 0; 8i then F (R) = 0 by N.)
If Rj = 1 then since F (H)  0, we get F (H [ fjg) = 1 by AR.
IfRj = 0 then as we supposed in the deniton, there was some j0 2 H such
that Rj0 = 1. Now let H 0 = (H [ fjg)  fj0g =) F (H 0)  0 as now we have n  1
people again.
F (H [ fjg) = F (((H [ fjg)  fj0g) [ fj0g) = 1, by AR. 
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Theorem 11 (Miroiu, 2004) If NSA holds, then a SWF F satises AR, NE, and SD
() it is the MR.
Proof.
( =): NE was proved at M1. To show F is AR is easy. Let H be such that
F (H)  0, and let j =2 H and Rj = 1: Then as F (H)  0 n+(H)  n (H); if we
add the person j with Rj = 1 we get n+(H) > n (H): Then F (H [ fjg) = 1 by
MR.(The reverse case is similar to show.) Hence F is AR.
(MR =) SD) : Suppose that F is MR and jHj = k and k = p + z +m. We
need to show F (H) = F (F (H1); :::::::F (Hr)) with Hj (1  j  r = 2k   1) the
subsets of H . Dene Ps(H) be the set of all sets H such that jHj = s: Obviously, is
s = 0; then F (H) = 0: Consider the cases:
p > m : Then for each s 9 no majority of sets H such that jHj = s and
F (H) =  1: (If 9 no such H at all, then F (H)  0 for all H; and since p > 0 9
at least oneH such that F (H) = 1; then as NSA, AR, and NE, implies PO by above
lemma, we will get F (H) = 1:) Even is there exists some H such that F (H) =  1
they are not majority of the whole subsets; therefore, MR will give the result F (H) =
1: Hence F (H) = F (F (H1); :::::::F (Hr)):
The other two cases where p = m and p < m are similar to show.
(=)): To prove the reverse implication, we will again use induction:
n = 1 : by Lemma 9, F (Rj) = Rj =MR(Rj);
n  2 : Supppose F is MR for all n0 < n: Consider the cases:
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p > m : Then there exists at least one individual j such thatRj = 1: For the
society H   fjg ; we have p  m and by the induction hypothesis F (H   fjg)  0:
By AR, F ((H   fjg) [ fjg) = F (H) = 1 =MR(H):
p < m : is similar to the above case.
p = m : If p = m = 0; then F (H) = F (0; :::; 0) = 0 = MR(H): Now let
p = m > 0, we have two subcases to consider:
z = 0 : Take any subsociety H1 (jH1j = k1) such that p1 of the voters
have Rj = 1 and m1 of the voters have Rj =  1 and k1 = p1 +m1; and there is one
and only one subsocietyH2 (jH2j = k1) such thatm1 of the voters haveRj = 1 and p1
of the voters have Rj =  1 and k1 = p1 +m1: By N, F (H1) =  F (H2). But as H1
was arbitrary, this is true for all subsocieties, they by N F (F (H1); :::::::F (Hr)) = 0:
Therefore, F (H) = 0 =MR(H) by SD.
z  1 : Then there is at least one j such that Rj = 0 and jH   fjgj =
n  1 meaning by induction hypothesis F (H   fjg) = 0 =) F ((H   fjg)[ fjg) =
0 = F (H) =MR(H): 
Theorem 12 (Woeginger, 2005) A SWF F satises NE, A, and APR () it is the
MR.
Proof.
( =): We already proved that if F is MR then it also satses NE, A at M1 and
M4. Proof of APR is similar to AR.
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(=)):By induction, Take any SWF F satisying NE, A, and APR:
n = 1=) F (0) = 0 = MR(0) by NE. Suppose for a contradictionF (1) =  
0; then by NE F ( 1) =    0: The society f 1; 1g on the one hand by adding the
new voter  1 to the society f1g which brings the result F (1; 1) =  1 by APR. On
the other hand, if we add voter 1 to the society f 1g ; we get F (1; 1) = 1 by again
APR, which leads to a contradiction. Hence F (1) = 1 = MR(1) and furthermore,
F ( 1) =  1 =MR( 1) by N.
n  2=) Assume F (R0) =MR(R0) for all R0 with n 1 voters. Now consider
a prole R with n voters:
p = m : Then F (R) = 0 =MR(R) by A and NE.
p  m + 1 : Then by the induction hypothesis we have p0  m0 and
F (R0)  0: Hence, F (R) = 1 =MR(R) by APR.
p  m   1 : This case is similar to prove the second case. Here we have
F (R) =  1 =MR(R):
Hence F is MR. 
The above theorem is very similar toMay's majority characterization sinceWoeg-
inger only replaces PR by APR, but he later shows that PR and APR are independent
of each other, which was shown in the "Independence" Part.
Remark1 (Woeginger, 2005) As SD =) AWoeginger replaced SD with A
in Miroiu's characterization.
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Theorem 13 (Woeginger, 2005) There exists a SWF F3 that is not MR and that sat-
ises NE, A, PO, and SD.
Proof.
F3 is dened as:
F3(R) = 0, if n+(R) = n (R) = 0 (I)
F3(R) = 1, if n (R) = 0 and n+(R) > 0 (II)
F3(R) =  1, if n+(R) = 0 and n (R) > 0 (lII)
F3(R) = 0, if n+(R) > 0 and n (R) > 0 (IV)
F3 is not MR as F3(1; 1; 1) = 0 6= 1 = MR(1; 1; 1). F3 clearly satises A,
NE, and PO. To show that F3 satises SD, consider n  2 and let R1; ::::::::Rkwith
k = 2n   1 be an enumeration of all proper multi-subsets of R. Consider the cases:
If n+(R) = n (R) = 0; then all multi-subsets Ri of R consists of indiffer-
ent voters only; therefore, the result will be indifference as well. Hence, F3(F3(R1); :::::; F3(Rk)) =
0 = F3(R):
If n (R) = 0 and n+(R) > 0, then all multi-subsets consists of indifferent
or positive voters only, meaning F3(Ri)  0 8i 2 k: And F3(Rj) = 1 for some
multi-subsets Rj: Therefore, F3(F3(R1); :::::; F3(Rk)) = 1 = F3(R):
If n+(R) = 0 and n (R) > 0, then the proof is similar to the previous case.
If n (R) > 0 and n+(R) > 0, then there exist one negative say "i" and
one positive say "j" voters, satisfying F3(Ri) =  1 and F3(Rj) = 1: Therefore,
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F3(F3(R1); :::::; F3(Rk)) = 0 = F3(R): Therefore F is SD, and the proof is com-
pleted. 
Remark2 (Llamazares, 2006) If F is NE, then:
(1) F (E0) = 0 since F (E0) = F ( E0) =  F (E0) = 0 by NE:
(2) F is characterized by the set F 1(f1g), since
F 1(f 1g) = fR 2 f 1; 0; 1gn :  R 2 F 1(f1g)g ;
F 1(f0g) = f 1; 0; 1gn(F 1(f1g) [ F 1(f 1g)):
Proposition 14 (Llamazares, 2006) If F is a C SWF, then F (R) = F (R) 8R 2
f 1; 0; 1gn nU and all permutation  on N:
Proof.
For any R 2 fR 2 f 1; 0; 1gn nU : n+(R) = n (R) +mg ; with m  0;m 6=
n   1 (since if we had the equality, our collection of proles would be U+), it is
enough to prove that F (R) = F (Em) since R amd m are arbitrary. (the reverse case,
n+(R) < n (R) is similar to prove.) Since n+(R) = n+(R) and n (R) = n (R)
for all permutation  on N , we will have F (R) = F (Em) = F (R):
Let's pick another prole R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn nU satisfying n+(R) = m and
n (R) = 0 such that F (R) = F (R) as F is C: Therefore, WLOG it is possible to
assume n+(R) = m and n (R) = 0 :
(1) If m = n or m = 0; then R = Em the result is either F ((1; ::::::; 1)) or
F ((0; ::::::; 0)):
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(2) If 1  m  n 2 andR 6= Em; then 9j 2 f1; ::::;mg and l 2 fm+ 1; :::::; ng
such that Rj = 0 and Rl = 1:As n+(R)  n   2;9r 2 N; r 6= j such that Rr = 0
Now we consider the proles R0 and R00 such that:
R0i =
8<: 1; if i = j; 1; if i = r;Ri; otherwise.
9=; ; R00i =

0; if i = r; l;
R0i; otherwise.

Since F is C we have F (R) = F (R0) = F (R00): If R00 6= Em; then we can
repeat the previous process until we nd such a prole. Hence F (R) = F (Em) even
if R 6= Em: 
Corollary 15 (Llamazares, 2006) If F is a C SWF, then F is completely determined
by its values in the set U [ fEj : j 2 N [ f0gg [ f Ej : j 2 Ng :
Corollary 16 (Llamazares, 2006) Let F be a C SWF:
(1) IfF is A, thenF is completely determined by its values in the set fEj : j 2 N [ f0gg[
f Ej : j 2 Ng (By A, U+ is included in the rst set here, and U  is included in the
second set.)
(2) If F is NE, then F is completely determined by its values in the set U+ [
fEj : j 2 N [ f0gg (We can reach the result just by taking the minus of these sets.)
(3) If F is A and NE, then F is completely determined by its values in the set
fEj : j 2 N [ f0gg (Reasoning is simple when we combine (1) and (2))
(4) If F is p-Pareto, then F is completely determined by its values in the set
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(a) fE0g, if p = 0 (f(0; ::::; 0)g):
(b) fEj : j 2 f0; 1; :::; pgg[f Ej : j 2 N [ f1; ::::pgg if p 2 f1; :::; n  2g
(i.e. fE0; E1; ::::::; Ep; g for p 2 f1; :::; n  2g):
(c) U [ fEj : j 2 f0; 1; :::; n  2gg [ f Ej : j 2 f1; :::; n  2gg if p =
n  1:
Theorem 17 (Llamazares, 2006) A SWF F is a Mk majority if and only if it is A,
NE, M, weak Pareto and C.
Proof.
(=)) : Let's rst check that anyMk majority satises the properties. It satises
A, as social consequence of Mk majority only depends on the numbers n+(R) and
n (R) but not on which prole belond to which individual. If we multiply each prole
by minus one then we get the opposite of the winner when it was 1 or  1, and 0 when
it was already 0, hence Mk majority is N. Take any R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that
R0  R =) n+(R0)  n+(R) =) F (R0)  F (R) proving Mk majority is M.
Mk majority is weak Pareto as the collective prole En has n+(En) = n > k since
k 2 f0; 1; ::::; n  1g : Mk majority is obviously C as we are interested in n+(R) and
n (R) only relatively.
((=) : Reciprocally, suppose that F is anonymous, neutral, monotonic, weak
Pareto and cancellative. By Corollary 16(3)F is determined by the set fEj : j 2 N [ f0gg.
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Since F is weak Pareto, F (En) = 1, and by Remark 2(1) we also have F (E0) = 0.
Moreover, F (Ei)  F (Ej) 8i > j because F is monotonic. Therefore, 9 k 2
f1; :::; n   1g such that F (Ek+1) = 1 and F (Ek) = 0; meaning, F is the Mk ma-
jority. 
Remark3 (Llamazares, 2006)
(1) The SWF F dened by F (R) =
8>><>>:
1; if R = En;
 1; if R =  En;
R1; if R 2 U;
0; otherwise.
9>>=>>; is NE, M, weak P,
and C, but not A. (Not A, as the rst person is the dictator when R 2 U:)
(2) The SWF F dened by F (R) =
8<: 1; if R 2 U
+ [ fEng ;
 1; if R =  En;
0; otherwise.
9=; is A, M, weak
P, and C, but not NE. (Not N, as F ( R) 6=  F (R))
(3) The SWF F dened by F (R) =
8<: 1; if R 2 U
  [ fEng ;
 1; if R 2 U+ [  fEng ;
0; otherwise.
9=; is NE,
A, weak P, and C, but not M. (Take R0 2 U+ and R 2 U  then R0  R, but F (R0) 
F (R) hence F is not M.)
(4) The null SWF, ie.i F (R) = 0 8R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn ; is A, NE, M and C, but not
weak P (as F (En) 6= 1 and F ( En) 6=  1). By above theorem, the null SWF is the
only one that satises these conditions.
(5) The AMR; AMR(R) =
8<: 1; if n
+(R) > n
2
;
 1; if n (R) > n
2
;
0; otherwise.
9=; is NE, M, weak P, and
A but not C. (let for the prole R; n+(R) = n where Rk = 1 and Rl =  1 then
AMR(R) = 1, furthermore let another prole R0such that R0k = 0 and R0l = 0 and
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Ri = R
0
i 8i 2 N   fk; lg then AMR(R) = 0, which according to C should have been
equal to 1 again. Hence AMR is not C.)
Theorem 18 (Llamazares, 2006) A SWF F is the MR if and only if it is C, strong
Pareto and F (E0) = 0:
Proof.
(=)) :MR implies C by M8. F is strong Pareto and F (E0) = 0 is obvious.
((=) : Now take any F such that it is cancellative, strong Pareto and F (E0) =
0: By Corollary 16(4a) any C and Strong Pareto SWF is determined by its value in the
prole E0: Hence, F is MR if F (E0) = 0: 
Remark4 (Llamazares, 2006)
(1) The SWF F dened by F (R) =
8<: 1; if n
+(R) > 0 and n (R) = 0;
 1; if n (R) > 0 and n+(R) = 0;
R1; otherwise:
9=;
is PO and F (E0) = 0, but not C.
(2) The SWF F dened by F (R) =  M0(R) 8R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn is C and
F (E0) = 0, but not PO.
(3) The SWF F dened by F (R) =

1; if n+(R)  n (R);
 1; if n (R) > n+(R);

is PO and
C, but F (E0) 6= 0.
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Corollary 19 (Llamazares, 2006) A SWF F is MR if and only if it is C, strong Pareto
and NE. (i.e.F (E0) = 0 is replaced by NE of previous theorem.)
Proof.
As we have NE implies F (E0) = 0; it is enough to consider the proof of the
previous theorem. 
Proposition 20 (Llamazares, 2006) Given k 2 f0; 1; :::; n   1g, theMk majority is
k-stable.
Proof.
We are going to prove that the Mk majority satises the conditions of being
q-Stable. Let R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that #fi 2 N : Ri 6= R0ig  k: Since
n+(R0)  n+(R)  k and n (R0)  n (R) + k; we have:
n (R0)  n (R) + k < n+(R)  n+(R0) + k; i.e. Mk(R0)  0:
The caseMk(R) =  1 comes from the NE ofMk.
On the other hand, in order to prove the second condition of Denition of q-
Stable F it is sufcient to consider Ek+1 and -Ek+1: 
Theorem 21 (Llamazares, 2006) Given k 2 f1; :::; n   2g, a SWF F is the Mk
majority if and only if it is NE, M, C and k-Pareto.
Proof.
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(=)) :Mk majority satises NE and C as MR satises all by M1 and M8. For
any proles R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that Ri  0 =) R0i  0 ( resp.) 8i 2 N ,
assume we have F (R)  0 ( resp.).then as F isMk majority n (R)  n+(R)+k so
as n (R0)  n+(R0) + k we have F (R0)  0: Hence F is M.Mk majority is k-Pareto
by above proposition.
((=) : Reciprocally, suppose that F is NE, M, C and k-Pareto. By Proposition
14, F (R) = F (R) 8 R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn n U and all permutation  on N. Moreover,
F (R) = 1 8 R 2 U because F is k-Pareto. Therefore, F is A and by Theorem 17 we
have that F is aMj majority for some j 2 f1; :::; n 2g. Finally, F is theMk majority
because it is k-Pareto. 
Remark5 (Llamazares, 2006) Let k 2 f1; :::; n  2g :
(1) The SWF F dened by F (R) =
8<: 1; if n
+(R) > n (R) + k;
 1; if n (R) > n+(R);
0; otherwise:
9=; is M, C
and k-Pareto, but not NE.
(2) The SWF F dened by
F (R) =
8<: 1; if n
+(R) > n (R) + k or n+(R) + k  n (R) > n+(R);
 1; if n (R) > n+(R) + k or n (R) + k  n+(R) > n (R);
0; otherwise:
9=;
is NE, C and k-Pareto, but not M.
(3) The SWF F dened by F (R) =
8<: 1; if n
+(R) > n (R) + k;
 1; if n (R) > n+(R) + k;
Ri; otherwise:
9=; is M,
NE and k-Pareto, but not C.
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(4) The SWF given in Remark 3(1) is NE, M and C, but not k-Pareto.
Theorem 22 (Llamazares, 2006) A SWF F is the unanimous majority if and only if
it is A, NE, M and (n-1)-Pareto.
Proof.
(=)) : Unanimous majority satises NE and C as MR satises all by M1 and
M8. For any proles R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that Ri  0 =) R0i  0 ( resp.) 8i 2
N , assume we have F (R)  0 ( resp.).then as F is unanimous majority n (R) 
n+(R) + (n   1) so as n (R0)  n+(R0) + (n   1) we have F (R0)  0: Hence F is
M. Unanimous majority is obviously (n-1)-Pareto, i.e. replace k by (n-1).
((=) : Reciprocally, suppose that F is A, NE, M and (n-1)-Pareto. By the
last property, F (En) = 1; F ( En) =  1 and 9R 2 U+ such that F (R) < 1
or R 2 U  with F (R) >  1: Assume that R 2 U+ (the case R 2 U  can
symmetrically be shown). Since F is N, by of Remark 2(1), F (E0) = 0, and by M of
F , F (R) = 0. Because F is A, F (R) = 0 8R 2 U+,and by the N, F (R) is also zero
8R 2 U . Now, given R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn n fEn; Eng ; 9R0 2 U  and R00 2 U+ such
that R0  R  R00: Consequently, by M of F; F (R) = 0: 
Proposition 23 (Llamazares, 2006) Let F be a no constant SWF such that F 1(f1g)
be not empty. Then there exist R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that #fi 2 N : Ri 6= R0ig =
1, F (R) = 1 and F (R0) < 1.
30
Proof.
Since F 1(f1g) 6= 0, there exists Rn 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that F (Rn) = 1.
Moreover, since F is not constant, there exists R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that F (R0) < 1.
For j 2 f1; :::; n  1g we consider the prole Rj dened by
Rji =

Rni ; if i  j;
R0i ; if i  j:

Since F (R0) < 1 and F (Rn) = 1, there exists j 2 f1; :::; n   1g such that
F (Rj) < 1 and F (Rj+1) = 1. Furthermore, #fi 2 N : Rji 6= Rj+1i g = 1: 
Proposition 24 (Llamazares, 2006) Let q 2 f0; 1; :::; n   1g, F be a NE, M and
q-stable SWF and R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn. Then:
(1) If F (R) = 1, then n+(R) > q:
(2) If F (R) =  1, then n (R) > q.
Proof.
(1) Suppose for a contradiction n+(R)  q and consider another prole R0 2
f 1; 0; 1gn dened by
R0i =
  1; if Ri = 1;
Ri; otherwise.

Since F (R) = 1,  R  R0;#fi 2 N : Ri 6= R0ig  q and F is NE, M and
q-Stable we have:
 1 = F ( R)  F (R0)  0; gives us a contradiction.
(2) Since F is NE, then F ( R) = 1, and by the previous case, n (R) =
n+( R) > q: 
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Remark6 (Llamazares, 2006)
(1) The SWF F dened by
F (R) =
8<: 1; if n
+(R) > n (R) + (n  2);
 1; if R =  En;
0; otherwise:
9=; is M and (n-1)-Stable, but not
NE.
(2) The SWF F dened by F (R) =  Mn 1(R) for all R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn is NE
and (n -1)-Stable, but not M.
(3)M0 is NE and M, but not (n-1)-Stable.
Theorem 25 (Llamazares, 2006) A SWF F is the unanimous majority iff it is NE, M
and (n-1)-Stable.
Proof.
(=)) : Unanimous majority satises NE and C as MR satises all by M1 and
M8. For any proles R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that Ri  0 =) R0i  0 ( resp.) 8i 2
N , assume we have F (R)  0 ( resp.).then as F is unanimous majority n (R) 
n+(R) + (n   1) so as n (R0)  n+(R0) + (n   1) we have F (R0)  0: Hence F is
M. Unanimous majority is obviously (n-1)-Stable.
((=) :Reciprocally, suppose that F is NE, M and (n-1)-stable. By the last prop-
erty, there exist R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that F (R) = 1 and F (R0) =  1. By Propo-
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sition 23, R = En; R0 =  En and F (R) = 0 for all R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn n fEn; Eng,
i.e., F is the unanimous majority. 
If F is an A and M SWF, then for all pair of proles R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn with
the same number of non-indifferent voters, i.e.,
n+(R) + n (R) = n+(R0) + n (R0); we have: n+(R)  n+(R0) =) F (R) 
F (R0):
Remark7 (Llamazares, 2006)
Let k 2 f0; 1; :::; n  2g
(1) The SWF F where there exists an oligarchy constituted by the rst k + 1
individuals, i.e.,
F (R) =
8<: 1; if Ri = 1 8i  k + 1; 1; if Ri =  1 8i  k + 1;
0; otherwise:
9=; is NE, M and k-Stable, but not A.
If we consider R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn dened by Ri =

1, if i  k + 1;
 1; otherwise.

then
F (R) = 1 andMk(R) < 1.
(2) The SWF F dened by
F (R) =
8<: 1; if n
+(R) > n (R) + (k   1);
 1; if n (R) > n+(R) + k;
0; otherwise:
9=; is A, M and k-Stable, but not
NE. In this case we have F (Ek) = 1 andMk(Ek) = 0:
(3) The SWF dened by F (R) =  Mk(R) 8R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn is A, NE and
k-Stable, but not M. Here we have F ( En) = 1 andMk( En) =  1:
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(4) If k 2 f0; 1; :::; n   2g; M0 is A, NE and M, but not k-Stable. In this case,
M0(E
1) = 1 andMk(E1) = 0 8k 2 f0; 1; :::; n  2g:
Theorem 26 (As¸an-Sanver, 2006) A SWF F satises A, NE, and M () F is a q-
majority rule for some q 2 fn; ::::::::; n+ 1g.
Proof.
( =): Take any F ,which is q-majority rule, we will show F satises A, NE, and
M.
When our rule is q-majority, for a candidate to be the winner the number of
supporters has to exceed the number q, so it has nothing to do who supports and who
the candidate is; q-majority rule is easily A and NE. It is left to show F is M. Take any
R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that Ri  0 =) R0i  0; i 2 N and assume F (R)  0, then
we need to show that F (R0)  0: For a contradiction assume that F (R0) =  1. Then
F (R0) =  1 means n (R0)  q, which contradicts n+(R0)  n+(R)  q, the reverse
case is similar.
(=)): Take any F satisfying A, NE, and M, to show F is a q-majority rule:
(1) 8R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn. IfF (R) = 1 then n+(R)  q for some q 2 fn; :::::; n+ 1g.
Similarly, if F (R) =  1 then n (R)  q for some q 2 fn; :::::; n+ 1g :
To show (1), take any R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that F (R) = 1 and suppose for
a contradiction n+(R) < n: Now set a preference prole R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such
that R0i = 1 () Ri = 1 and R0i = 0 () Ri 2 f 1; 0g : By M F (R0) = 1
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as well. Now take a set of voters K with cardinality n+(R) such that i 2 K =)
Ri 2 f 1; 0g, which is possible as we assumed n+(R) < n: Consider another prole
R00 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that R00i = 1 () Ri = 1 and R00i =  1 () i 2 K; 8i 2 N:
By A and N F (R00) = 0 (ie. n+(R00) = n (R00)), which combined with F (R) = 1,
contradicts M, as whenR00  0 =) R  0we should have F (R00)  0 =) F (R)  0
(but not F (R) = 1 as here is the case). The case of F (R) =  1 is similar.
(2) 8R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn. If F (R) = 1 and n+(R0)  n+(R) then F (R0) = 1:
If F (R) =  1 and n (R0) = n (R) then F (R0) =  1:
To show (2), take any R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that F (R) = 1 and n+(R0) 
n+(R). Suppose for a contradiction, F (R0) 2 f 1; 0g : Now pick another prole
Q 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that Qi = 1 () Ri = 1 and Qi = 0 () Ri 2 f 1; 0g ;
8i 2 N: By M F (Q) = 1 as when R  0 =) Q  0 we have F (R)  0 =)
F (Q)  0. Similarly, pick Q0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that Q0i = 1 () R0i = 1 and
Q0i = 0 () R0i 2 f 1; 0g ; 8i 2 N: Again by M F (Q0) 2 f 1; 0g : Next pick
Q00 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that n+(Q00) = n+(Q0) thus by A F (Q00) 2 f 1; 0g, which
together with F (Q) = 1 contradicts with M, as when Q00  0 =) Q  0 we should
have F (Q00)  0 =) F (Q)  0 (but not F (Q) = 1 as here is the case).
(1) and (2) together shows that 9q1; q2 2 fn; :::::; n+ 1g such that 8R 2
f 1; 0; 1gn we have (F (R) = 1 () n+(R)  q1)(F (R) =  1 () n (R)  q2).
By A and N of F q1 and q2 must be equal and therefore, F is an absolute q-majority
rule. 
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Side Results
Proposition 27 (Sanver, 2006) TheMR is not Maskin Monotonic.
Proof.
Take some R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that R1 = 1; R2 =  1 and Ri = 0; 8i 2
Nn f1; 2g. Then since p = m, we have MR(R) = 0. Now take another prole
R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that R01 = 0; and R0i = Ri; 8i 2 Nn f1g : Here since n (R) >
n+(R), we haveMR(R0) =  1. While we have Ri  0 =) R0i  0 8i 2 N , we do
not haveMR(R)  0 =)MR(R0)  0 (but we haveMR(R)  0 andMR(R0) < 0
instead), which proves thatMR is not M. 
Theorem 28 (Sanver, 2006) TheAMR (absolute majority rule) is the minimal monotonic
extension of theMR.
Proof.
For this it is useful to interpret the outcomes 1; 1; 0 as fag ; fbg fa; bg respec-
tively.
First, to show that AMR is M, take any R;R0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn such that Ri 
0 =) R0i  0; i 2 N and assume AMR(R)  0, then we need to show that
AMR(R0)  0: For a contradiction assume that AMR(R0) =  1 and let n be the
lowest integer exceeding n=2. Then AMR(R0) =  1 means n (R0)  n, which
contradicts n+(R0)  n+(R)  n, the reverse case is similar.
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Second, to showMR(R)  AMR(R), cosider cases:
If MR(R) = fag then n+(R) > n (R) leading either AMR(R) = fag or
AMR(R) = fa; bg : HenceMR(R)  AMR(R):
If MR(R) = fbg then n (R) > n+(R) leading either AMR(R) = fbg or
AMR(R) = fa; bg : HenceMR(R)  AMR(R):
If MR(R) = fa; bg then n+(R) = n (R) leading AMR(R) = fa; bg as none
of n+(R) or n (R):can exceed n: HenceMR(R)  AMR(R):
Last, it is left to show its minimality. Suppose for a contradiction 9 a M SWF
F : f 1; 0; 1gn  ! f 1; 0; 1g such that MR(R)  F (R)  AMR(R);8R 2
f 1; 0; 1gn and F (Rs) 6= AMR(Rs) for some Rs 2 f 1; 0; 1gn : Therefore for
AMR(Rs) to have a proper subset, it should be equal tofa; bg, otherwise it could
have no proper subset and WLOG assume F (Rs) = fag, so we set it as a proper
subset of AMR(Rs): By denition, of fa; bg, n+(Rs) < n and n (Rs) < n: Also
asMR(R)  F (R) 8R 2 f 1; 0; 1gn, we also haveMR(Rs) = fag, which means
n+(R
s) > n (Rs): Now let another preference prole Rs0 2 f 1; 0; 1gn be such
that 8i 2 N if Rsi = 0, then Rs0i =  1; 8j 2 N if Rsj 2 f 1; 1g, then Rs0j = Rsj :
For this new prole, as all 0's became 1, we now have either n+(Rs0) = n (Rs0), or
n (Rs0) > n+(Rs0); therefore, denitely b 2 MR(Rs0), and so b 2 F (Rs0) as well.
However, b =2 F (Rs), which contradicts with F being M as when Rs0  0 =) Rs 
0, we should have F (Rs0)  0 (which is the case as either we have F (Rs0) = fa; bg
or F (Rs0) = fbg) =) F (Rs)  0 (which is not the case as F (Rs) = fag). 
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Concluding Remarks
Within the thesis, we have characterized all from simple majority rule to unan-
imous majority rule, which are the two extreme examples of Mk majority rules, and
further more we have characterized absolute majority rule, which requires lowest num-
ber of supporters, for an alternative to win , among absolute q-majority rules. As the
next step, it could be interesting to consider more than two alternatives, for which Yi
(2005) has done certain work.
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